Panel 3: Transparency and Access of Independent Experts to All Places of Detention:
Expectations of the Subcommittee on the Prevention of Torture,
the National Preventative Mechanisms, and the UN Optional Protocol to the
Convention against Torture by Evans, Malcolm
Human Rights Brief
Volume 16 | Issue 4 Article 17
2009
Panel 3: Transparency and Access of Independent
Experts to All Places of Detention: Expectations of
the Subcommittee on the Prevention of Torture,
the National Preventative Mechanisms, and the
UN Optional Protocol to the Convention against
Torture
Malcolm Evans
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons
This Conference Proceeding is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons
@ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Human Rights Brief by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Evans, Malcolm. "Panel 3: Transparency and Access of Independent Experts to All Places of Detention: Expectations of the
Subcommittee on the Prevention of Torture, the National Preventative Mechanisms, and the UN Optional Protocol to the Convention
against Torture." Human Rights Brief 16, no.4 (2009): 48-50.
48
Thank you very much indeed for this oPPortunity to sPeak to you this afternoon. One of the difficulties of having listened to so many presentations during the 
course of the day is that the rather rough notes that I intended 
to speak from have evolved into more of a work of art than a 
set of speaker’s notes, as they attempt to reflect and respond to 
the points made. Nevertheless, what I’m going to do in the time 
available is to attempt to address the question which is posed on 
the sheet: ‘Expectations of the Subcommittee on the Prevention 
of Torture, the National Preventative Mechanisms and the UN 
Optional Protocol to the Torture Convention.’ Although this 
really does require more than five minutes per topic, I shall see 
what can be done. 
As with any academic giving a presentation who is a little 
unsure of quite what to do, the first thing is to deconstruct the 
question. The moment I saw this title, the immediate question 
that came to my mind was: whose expectations are we talking 
about here? Are we talking about the expectations of the states 
parties or are we concerned with the expectations of the various 
bodies themselves? There are a whole host of other angles and 
questions that could legitimately be factored in besides these, 
but you would be pleased to know I’m not going to do so. 
As Manfred Nowak said at the start this morning, the 
Optional Protocol to the Torture Convention is seen as one of 
the most important new developments relating to torture and 
torture prevention for many years. I want to reflect on that just 
for a few moments. Although it is a ‘new development’ in that 
the Protocol only entered into force in 2006, it’s not that new an 
idea. The idea underlying the Optional Protocol owes its origins 
to thinking which emerged at more or less the same time as the 
thinking which led to the conclusion of the Convention against 
Torture itself back in the mid to late 1970s. To that extent, the 
ideas were contemporaries, but they had very different trajecto-
ries. The Convention against Torture itself was taken forward 
in now what looks like a very rapid process, with negotiations 
beginning in the late 70s and being concluded by 1984. The 
idea of this Optional Protocol, which I will outline in just a few 
moments, was also originally conceived in the late 1970s, and 
was tabled alongside the negotiations for the Convention itself. 
However, it was immediately set aside on the grounds that what 
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it was trying to achieve was too far in advance of what would 
legitimately be expected of the international community at that 
time: it was premature. It was then reintroduced in 1991, in the 
form of a draft tabled by Costa Rica to the then UN Commission 
on Human Rights, and the process of discussion and negotia-
tion was not finally brought to a conclusion until 2002. So, it’s 
fair to say that it has taken about 25 years to bring the Optional 
Protocol into being. 
What does this tell us? First, and perhaps most importantly, it 
gives the lie to the impression which one could perhaps be for-
given for having received in light of the many points that have 
already been made during this conference, that it is obvious that 
the monitoring of places of detention plays a very important part 
in the process of addressing torture and inhuman or degrading 
treatment and punishment. The history of the evolution of this 
instrument suggests that this is an argument that has been long 
fought-over before it has finally been won, if indeed it has been 
won (and this is an important qualification). 
What does the optional protoCol require oF  
states parties?
On one level its requirements seem remarkably, even breath-
takingly, simple. The underlying idea is that the prevention of 
torture, inhuman, and degrading treatment can be facilitated by 
visits of a preventive nature to all places of detention. Whilst 
this sounds disarmingly simple, it is of course no such thing. 
As has already been made clear by others, if there is too much 
advanced notice of such visits, then preparations can be made, 
with all that that implies. In consequence, the idea evolves 
slightly into unannounced visits to places of the detention with 
absolute rights of access to be conducted at short or no notice. 
But this inevitably must be subject to a variety of constraints for 
legitimate operational reasons, and the moment one starts writ-
ing in these inevitable riders and qualifications into instruments 
developed in the international domain, one immediately runs 
into some fairly powerful problems. 
The overall title of this Panel is “transparency” – and one of 
the paradoxes of the international monitoring system created by 
the Optional Protocol (and indeed in the European Convention 
for the Prevention of Torture, which was an early product of 
this line of thinking) is that the price to be paid for access to 
places of detention by international mechanisms of this nature 
– is that there has to be, in some senses, a lack of transparency. 
Confidentiality is the quid pro quo that states have demanded for 
the creation of these international mechanisms permitting inter-
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national experts to visit and have access to places of detention, 
and that veil of confidentiality may only be lifted by the express 
consent of the state itself. In many ways, this is considered less 
transparent than much of what else happens within the human 
rights world and indeed considerably less transparent than what 
already takes place at the domestic level in many states, where 
the reports or outcomes of domestic monitoring mechanisms are 
publicly available. This says something about the sensitive, if 
not controversial, nature of such mechanisms at the international 
level.
I ought to say, if I may, that much has been said today of 
the United States’ experience in the international domain, and 
it must be said that the United States was not one of the most 
whole-hearted supporters of the Optional Protocol. Indeed, 
when the Convention was put to the UN General Assembly for 
adoption, it was one of the four states which voted against, being 
supported by the Marshall Islands, Palau and Nigeria. When the 
draft text had been considered by the UN Third Committee, the 
United States had also voted against, along with Syria, Cuba, 
China, Vietnam, Nigeria, Japan and Israel. It is fair to say 
that the U.S. has long been, at best, ambivalent with regard to 
this project. Once again, this underlies the need to continually 
rearticulate the case for preventive visits to places of detention 
as an element of the preventive framework of torture.
What does the optional protoCol require? 
The most innovative element of the Protocol was in some 
regard the product of the negotiating difficulties which sur-
rounded it. As originally conceived and drafted, it was designed 
to create a single international visiting mechanism, much like 
that which exists in Europe, the European Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture. However, the opposition to a purely 
international mechanism was such that a compromise proposal 
was put forward: that the Protocol should have within it a dual 
system, comprising an international preventive mechanism 
whilst also permitting states to construct their own domestic 
national preventive mechanisms, which would exercise exactly 
the same type of powers of visit as the protocol provided for the 
international mechanism. 
The idea of there being a choice between the international 
on the one hand, and the national on the other, was clearly 
unacceptable to many of those behind the idea of international 
monitoring as a preventive tool. So, over time, these two ele-
ments became drawn ever more closely together, resulting in the 
composite dual system that now exists. The Protocol provides 
for the creation of an international body, the Subcommittee 
on Prevention of Torture (SPT) which currently comprises ten 
members, but is likely soon to rise to 25 members when the 
number of states parties to the instrument rises from its current 
number of 44 to 50. The SPT has the mandate to visit any state 
party in order to visit places of detention as they wish, with 
unimpeded access; the quid pro quo being that their reports 
and commentaries are transmitted to the state in confidence 
and only are released with permission from the state. Alongside 
this, however, lies an obligation for states parties to create or 
designate a national preventive mechanism, or mechanisms, 
which have exactly the same powers of access to place where 
persons may be detained of their liberty by a public authority. 
This might require the creation of an entirely new body working 
at the domestic level or it might be satisfied by the designation 
of existing bodies where they already exist within the system. 
Whilst the Protocol provides a degree of detail surrounding 
these national preventive mechanisms, there is considerable 
scope for national interpretation – and hence debate – about 
what they required in practice. 
The twin-track system created by the Convention is certainly 
innovative and is proving to be extraordinarily challenging, as 
is shown by the practice to date. It is challenging because the 
international committee, the Subcommittee for the Prevention 
of Torture, does not have the practical capacity to fulfill the 
full reach of its mandate. In its first annual report published 
last year, the Subcommittee says that it would aspire to visit all 
countries a party to the instrument on a cycle of around four or 
five years. Given that there are now 44 states, and it seems able 
on the resources available to it to be able to visit no more than 
three or four a year, it is clear this aspiration is unlikely to be 
realized. Before one gets too despondent about this, it has to be 
said that exactly the same is true in the European Theater, where 
the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, which is 
far better resourced, has proven itself unable to match its own 
aspirations in terms of regularity of visiting. So, one might say 
that one thing states ought not to expect from the international 
committee, to avert to the title of this talk, is very frequent visit 
from the international body itself. For most of those working 
within places of detention, or within their administrative appa-
ratus, a visit from the SPT might literally be a once in a lifetime 
experience. 
What might be expected as a consequence of the Optional 
Protocol, however, is a much more developed system of 
inspection of places of detention from the national preventive 
mechanisms operating within the Convention framework. The 
difficulty here is working out precisely what is meant by a 
national preventive mechanism. This ties in with one of the most 
fundamental questions that the creation of the Protocol has gen-
erated: What is meant by ‘preventive visits’? What is meant by 
the overall and overarching idea of the concept of prevention? In 
terms of looking at the types of bodies that deal with or address 
concerns within detention facilities in many countries, there is a 
seemingly straightforward differentiation between those mecha-
nisms which are seen as being reactive (such as ombudsmen’s 
offices, complaints commissions, etc., who, when there are 
known to be difficulties, will move in to address the problem) 
and those which are seen as more proactive bodies and who 
visit on the basis of a more general inspectoral mandate, and 
which, on a regular, routine basis, go into facilities to observe 
the conditions of detention, to observe the way in which people 
are treated, and to make recommendations as to how matters 
might be improved. This ‘bright line’ division between reactive 
and proactive certainly is one of the hallmarks of a body which 
is properly configured as a national preventive mechanism relat-
ing to torture and ill-treatment as opposed to a body which is, in 
essence, a complaints mechanism (important though these are). 
One needs to understand more about what is meant by the con-
cept of prevention to understand more fully both what the practi-
2
Human Rights Brief, Vol. 16, Iss. 4 [2009], Art. 17
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/vol16/iss4/17
50
cal work of the SPT should be, and also to understand what is 
to be expected of the national preventive mechanisms, in terms 
of designation and operation. On this point, it is possible to step 
back a little in order to isolate and identify a few more general 
trends which inform this. I also think that these trends concern-
ing the development of an overarching concept of prevention are 
significant not only for the international visiting mechanisms or 
the national visiting mechanisms, but also for the work of the 
Committee Against Torture itself, the Special Rapporteur, and 
many of the other international bodies 
The broader issues, very briefly, are these. First of all, if one 
looks at the judgment of the International Court of Justice in 
the Bosnian Genocide case a little while ago, a very interesting 
observation can be made about the grounds on which Serbia 
Montenegro was held liable. It was not because it was directly 
responsible for the actions of those who had committed geno-
cide or genocidal acts in Srebrenica, but, the court tells us, for 
its failure to have done all it could have done to prevent those 
violations from taking place. In other words, in relation to the 
Genocide Convention (which as far as I can see in relevant terms 
is couched exactly the same as the Torture Convention and the 
torture prohibition), we find in general international law the 
beginnings of the emergence of a more general preventive con-
cept. I think this is really rather important, and more needs to be 
done, to tease out the implications of this. (There are of course 
resonances with the more general concept of the ‘responsibility 
to protect’, but that lies beyond the scope of these observa-
tions). Secondly, the idea of national preventive mechanisms 
as a means of addressing human rights concerns is becoming 
more broadly applied. The UN Disability Rights Convention, 
for example, now has the equivalent of national preventive 
mechanisms written into that, and some countries, including my 
own, are now beginning to reflect on how they respond to that 
challenge. This, and any further such developments, may have 
a significant impact on our understanding of what national pre-
ventive mechanisms are and how they should function. 
One of the issues that has arisen in some countries which 
have already designated national human rights commissions as 
national preventive mechanisms under the OPCAT is whether 
they should use the same bodies to fulfill the national preventive 
mechanism requirements of the Disability Rights Convention 
(and any others which come along). The answer to this is likely 
to depend upon what one means by prevention and how this 
plays out in the context of two very different sets of obligations. 
States, in the interests of efficiency and economy, may well 
seek to draw those strands together in something that will end 
up looking like a single overarching remit tacked on to national 
human rights commissions which is likely to be ill-suited to 
achieve the outcomes of either instrument. There is, then, very 
important work to be done with regard to refining our under-
standing of what it required. 
Finally, there is some very recent practice from the UK, 
which I should like to draw to your attention. Last week, the 
House of Lords gave a very important decision concerning the 
British policy of ‘Deportation with Assurances’. Deportation 
with Assurances is the current British response to the problem 
of what to do about a situation in which foreign nationals within 
the jurisdiction who one wishes to deport as they are believed 
to be a threat to national security but who cannot be deported 
due to the risk of their being subjected to forms of torture, inhu-
man, degrading treatment or other human rights violations. In 
a very interesting, and I think very important judgment given 
by the House of Lords last week ((RB (Algeria) and others v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] UKHL 10 
(18 February 2009)) it was decided that is was permissible to 
return a person to Jordan, despite there being a real risk that 
the person would be subjected to judicial proceedings in which 
evidence that had been the product of torture would be used 
against him. One of the Judges – Lord Hoffman – said the fol-
lowing: “As to external monitoring, a good deal has been written 
about its importance in enabling a court or other authority to be 
satisfied that the receiving state is complying with assurances 
about safety upon return. There is no doubt that in the absence 
of some provision for external monitoring, such assurances may 
be no more than empty words. But, there is no rule of law that 
external monitoring is required.” The House of Lords stressed 
that what was necessary was some form of verification; and 
external monitoring, monitoring places of detention – visiting 
mechanisms – are only one possible form of verification that can 
be set aside if others sufficient means of verification are in place. 
In this instance, the Court felt that the provisions which were in 
place were adequate for this purpose, even though they did not 
include visiting mechanisms along the lines of those provided 
for in the OPACT.
I think this, once again, underlines why it is important to con-
tinue to articulate the importance of monitoring places of deten-
tion as part of the broader overarching idea of torture prevention 
and underscores the need to devise a more general preventive 
approach which embraces visits as a monitoring mechanism 
within a coherent overall holistic approach, rather than its being 
seem as a discrete subset of activity. 
I wish time would allow me to say more on this topic – but 
I am sure you don’t, and it is your wish which is going to be 
acceded to! Thank you for the attention. HRB
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